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Articles
W. L. Morison* Frames of Reference
for Legal Ideals
I. A Historical Sketch
1. Law as the Embodiment of Common Sense.
The publication of Canada's most newly established legal journal by
Canada's oldest established common law school naturally prompts
reflections concerning the elements of continuity and change in
legal writing, and legal thinking generally. Legal writing has so
radically changed during the existence of Canada's oldest common
law school, or for that matter during the existence of Australia's
oldest law school to which the writer belongs, that articles written
even during the earlier part of this century excite feelings of
nostalgia in some people. In welcoming an article published in the
Sydney Law Review in the nineteen fifties, Dean Erwin Griswold of
Harvard Law School described it as an "old line" article of which
he wished that more were published nowadays. I
What were the characteristics of these "old line" museum
pieces? One commonly heard suggestion, at least in Australia, is
that they were absorbed in technicality, with a lack of appreciation
of real issues, and that for this reason there is little occasion to be
nostalgic about their passing. But this is certainly an oversimplifica-
tion. There is a good deal less technicality, in the sense of attempt at
comprehensive summation of the authorities, in the writings of
older writers like Holmes, Pollock, Dicey or even Anson, than
would be found now in many law review articles. What was rather
characteristic of such writings was belief in the validity of the
continuing values, enshrined in the law as they had emerged even in
the remote past, accompanied by varying degrees of anxiety about
threats to those values from social factors developing outside the
law. In Dicey's case, this exhibited itself particularly in his deep
suspicions of what he called colleciivism2 and, in Pollock's case, in
*W. L. Morison, Professor of Law, The University of Sydney.
1. In a letter to the then editor.
2. See, e.g., A. V. Dicey. Law of the Constitution London: MacMillan, (9th ed.,
1939) introduction by E. C. S. Wade lxxxviii-xc; A. V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in
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his attempts to pin down what of the law could be pinned down in
codifications of various branches of it. He worked at these
assiduously, despite the belief which he expressed that a statute by
the nature of it was less effective to dispose of a problem than a well
considered judgment in the same sense.
3
There is no sharp distinction between "old line" and "new line"
writing in the centrally important respect of the interest shown in the
relations between law and society. Men regarded as innovators in
Harvard like Ames were legal historians as Pollock was, 4 among
other things, and as Dicey was, even if he was more concerned with
the recent than the remote past. 5 Nor were those men whose
writings are the older classics from our viewpoint now mere
historians of doctrine. Pollock annotated Maine's pioneering
attempt to correlate the development of various more general
features of the law with social conditions in a variety of
civilisations 6 and his Oxford took the legal historians Vinogradoff
and Holdsworth to its bosom. Dicey attempted to correlate legal
developments with social conditions in England and to explore
continental comparisons.
Pollock's adverse reaction to the young Roscoe Pound of Harvard
- his description of him as "ingenious" to Holmes was not in the
context intended to be complimentary 7 - is from this point of view
at first sight puzzling. For there was much that Pound shared with
all those already mentioned. His interest in the stages of legal
development, and in Continental as well as English and American
developments, was on a scale rather more comprehensive than their
own. But this was no doubt part of the trouble. The Oxford tradition
emphasized care and thoroughness of legal and social research in
particular areas or aspects. It was inimical to generalisations on the
grand scale about the springs of socio-legal development in all its
aspects at a particular time. However, the nature of the
England London: MacMillan (2nd ed., 1914, reprint of 1930) Introduction and
211-302.
3. Sir Frederick Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valour (1929), 45 L.Q.Rev. 293,
297.
4. See, e.g., F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, History of English Law before the
Time of Edward I Cambridge: University Press (1st ed., 1895).
5. See, e.g., A. V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England, supra n. 2.
6. Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law London: J. Murray (lst. ed., - with notes by
Sir Frederick Pollock - 1906).
7. 2 Pollock-Holmes Letters Cambridge: Harvard University Press, (1942, ed.
Howe) 141. Cf. the description of Pound as "monstrous learned, but" 1 Id. 228.
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generalisations which were beginning to appear in Pound's work
about the springs of legal development were certainly more
important in exciting suspicion than the fact that generalisations of
this degree of comprehensiveness were made at all.
For the English writers dominant before the first World War legal
argument on controversial matters could be carried on in terms of no
more ambitious background criterion than what it was that common
sense required in the circumstances. 8 When, for example, Pollock
and Anson disagreed about the decision in Derry v. Peek, 9 it was to
this criterion that they both appealed in support of their opposite
views. Anson said that if his decision had gone the way Pollock
thought it ought to have - and on this matter judicial posterity has
supported Pollock - English law would not be "a monument of
practical common sense". 10 Pollock did not deny that in general the
common law was this, but supported on the particular matter, as
opposed to Anson, what he asserted to be the common opinion of
Lincoln's Inn. 1 Vinogradoff, consistently with this approach,
entitled his introductory work for law students "Common Sense in
Law". 
1 2
There were two striking and related features about this concept.
In the first place, common sense was conceived as something very
much embodied in the law itself, rather than as something
presenting a set of demands on it in any way markedly divergent
from the state of the actual law as it was conceived to be. It will be
observed that Anson writes of the law as a monument of common
sense and Vinogradoff of common sense in law. In the second
place, little philosophical analysis was applied to the concept itself.
It was used rather than analysed and this tendency persisted in
Oxford to a much later stage in the writer's experience as a student.
In both these aspects, English legal thinking might be considered
as in a state of decline at the beginning of this century, perhaps
attributable to the aftermath of late Victorian self-satisfaction with
the state of the law and the performance of the elements in English
society who were in charge of it. In earlier Victorian times, the
8. See, e.g., Pollock in article cited supra n. 3, especially at 295.
9. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 337.
10. Sir W. R. Anson, Derry v. Peek in the House of Lords, (1890), 6 L.Q.Rev.
72, 74.
11. See 1 Pollock-Holmes Letters 215.
12. Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Common Sense in Law (London: Oxford University
Press 1913).
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question whether the law measured up to standards worked out in
terms of philosophical conceptions external to the law itself had
been the subject of extended examination by a string of legal
philosophers working to elaborate and apply the Benthamite
Utilitarian conception of the greatest happiness of the greatest
number.1 3 But while the Benthamite method of defining the law as
it is by reference to the command of the sovereign continued to be
dominant in English legal writing, interest in Utilitarianism as a
method of determining what the law ought to be as a constant
stimulus to law reform had declined, though Dicey was exceptional
in this respect. 14 As Dicey showed, 15 this was largely because the
particular applications made of it by Bentham and his disciples,
while in the first instance salutary in removing obsolete legal
restraints on social and economic development, had been
discredited when they were availed of to support inhumanitarian
excesses of the middle classes, whom they had helped to liberate,
against the lower classes who became increasingly enslaved to their
operations. Consequently, when in the late nineteen fifties,
Oxford's H. L. A. Hart sought to rebut the charge from Harvard's
Lon L. Fuller than the English positivist tradition was associated
with a lack of interest in questions about what the law ought to be,
he found himself going back a long way in order to assemble the
rebutting evidence. 
16
2. Law as Adjustment to Socio-Legal Evolution
Pound's work represented a break away in the direction of emphasis
upon ethical questions. His most general definition of law,
however, scarcely brings this out. The notion of law as "the regime
of ordering human activities and adjusting human relations through
the systematic application of the force of a politically organized
society" 17 retains the conception of law as something supported by
political power which was central to the positivist approach - law
13. Especially by John Austin. See Lectures on Jurisprudence (London: J.
Murray, 5th ed., 1885, ed. Campbell) Lectures 3 and 4.
14. A. V. Dicey, Law and Opinion in England (London: MacMillan, 2nd ed.,
1914)passim.
15. Id., Lecture VI ff.
16. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals (1958), 71
Harvard L. Rev. 593.
17. See, e.g., R. Pound, I Jurisprudence (St. Paul: West, 1959) 13.
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as something imposed - of Bentham, 1 8 the approach which had
survived in English legal thought up to the time when Pound began
to write. But it is one of the more specialised notions of law
mentioned by Pound which he himself seems to have most occasion
to use. In this sense law for Pound is "the aggregate of laws, the
whole body of legal precepts which obtain in a given politically
organized society".19 "But", Pound adds, "in a wider phase of
this sense it may mean the body of authoritative grounds of, or
guides to, judicial and administrative action, and so of prediction of
such action, established or recognized in such a society including
precepts, technique, and received ideals." 
2 0
Of the three concepts with which the passage last quoted
concludes that of "received ideals" is, from the point of view of
Pound's relationship with the classical English writers, the most
important. For it functions in some respects to replace the notion of
common sense, itself left in most of the classical writers amorphous
and conceived as spread amorphously through the precepts and
techniques. We are now invited instead to isolate the ideals of law
for study and consider their relationship to the precepts and
techniques. Moreover, the notion that they are "received" raises
the question of the sources from which they are received. In this
connection, as in others, Pound envisages that there is involved a
process of response to developing social situations, and hence
change in or accretion to, the ideals over a period. As an example,
in describing the degree of reception of English law in the early
formative period of American law, Pound says that in some cases
"the courts determined what was applicable and what was not by
reference to an idealized picture of pioneer, rural America of our
formative era and this picture became a received ideal".21 Pound
conceives an ideal as received when it has "acquired a certain fixity
in the judicial and professional tradition"22 But only, of course, a
"certain" fixity, a fixity in degree, not necessarily a permanent
fixity.
The examination of the ideals embodied in the law at any
particular time in this way raised important questions about the
18. Jeremy Bentham, The Limits of Jurisprudence Defined (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1945, ed. Everett) 88.
19. See,e.g., I Jurisprudence 12.
20. Ibid.
21. 3 Jurisprudence 431. Cf. 2 Jurisprudence 117-118.
22. R. Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision (1923), 36 Harvard L.Rev. 641,
654.
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frames within which the more fundamental aspects of lawyers'
thinking should be carried on. If a particular writer is in general
satisfied with the sets of values represented by the law as it stands, it
is natural for him to idealise the concept of "law" or "the law"
itself as a focus in terms of which he organizes the demands he
makes, and this is particularly so if he feels that set of values
threatened by rising forces in society outside of the law. This the
writer takes to be the position in which the classical writers found
themselves. A reformer, on the other hand, while perhaps finding
some values which he supports embodied in the law will want to see
these kept under examination, will therefore want to emphasize the
impermanence from his point of view in at least some of the values
embodied in the law, and the frame or focus of his thinking about
legal ideals is likely to be some concept of society and the way it
develops rather than the law itself. This the writer takes to be
Pound's position.
Thus, in calling upon jurists, as perhaps their most important
task, to induce a consciousness in the judges of the role ideal
pictures of the social and legal order play in the development of the
law, Pound places the task of picturing the social order first. He
describes the task as one of inducing a consciousness of the role of
ideal pictures of the social and legal order both in decision and in
declaring the law".
23
Pound's notion of the way society and law develop in relation to
one another was well adapted to a very moderate reformism. In so
far as there is a single notion in Pound's work, corresponding in the
function it serves to the function served by common sense in the
work of the classical Engish writers, it is the notion of civilisation.
The function of the legislator or judge is the maintaining, furthering
and transmitting of civilisation, and the function of the jurist is to
develop approaches aiding the judge in the "maintaining,
furthering, and transmitting of civilization". 24 Pound thought of the
development of society as the development of civilisation, and
ideally the development of law as going through corresponding
phases of development as civilisation developed, as one means of
social control rendering the successive stages through which
civilisation developed effective and secure. Moreover, he consi-
dered that on the whole law had performed this function properly
23. Id., 958.
24. 1 Jurisprudence 287.
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and effectively, with the result that the successive stages of the
development of law do in fact reflect the successive stages of the
development of civilisation. Further, the development of civilisa-
tion in a society is conceived as proceeding in a more or less
continuous evolutionary fashion if a sufficiently broad time span is
looked at, rather than in fits and starts with periods of reaction and
revolution, and it is thought to be the same with law.
On this sort of approach it will be seen that the ideals embodied in
the law at any particular time - the "received" ideals - will be
expected to contain much that is of value at least for the next stage
of the process of adaptation of law to the development of society.
They may even contain large elements of permanent value if it is
supposed that evolution takes place by building upon at least some
achievements of the past which retain a degree of identity and are
never wholly transformed. Pound did indeed make this supposition.
He thought of law in a developed society as having proceeded
through a number of successive stages defined as those of primitive
law, strict law, equity and natural law, maturity of law and a current
less easily defined fifth stage.2 5 The permanent contribution of
primitive law was the idea of a peaceable ordering of the
community, that of strict law the idea of certainty and uniformity in
the ordering,2 6 that of the period of equity and natural law the idea
of good faith and moral conduct attained by reason,2 7 and probably
that of the state of maturity of law the idea of individual legal
rights, 28 with the fifth stage adding, though not as yet permanently
securing, the idea of the importance of securing social interests in
the sense of satisfying as much as possible of the sum total human
demand. 29 The development of law in these respects is seen as
paralleling the development of community ideals as articulated by
the community's social philosophers. Thus Pound relies on the
philosopher William James for the idea that philosophical thinking
in this area has proceeded through stages in which it was first
supposed that the end of law was keeping the peace. Then it was
asked, why keep the peace, and the answer seemed to be, for the
purpose of maintaining the social order. But then the question was
raised why maintain the social order, and the answer given that this
25. Id., 366.
26. Id., 405-6,421.
27. Id., 406-7, 421.
28. Id., 427.
29. Id., 432.
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makes division of labour possible and sets us free for individual
self-assertion. But then the question was raised of the reason for
supporting freedom and the answer given, because it is a strong
human demand, and the desirable objective for social controls of
any kind, law or others, is the maximum satisfaction of human
wants.
30
The particular form of evolutionary ethical theory which Pound
espoused was well designed not only for a moderate reformism
generally, but to enable him to have something of both worlds on
the special issue of the most satisfactory frame for consideration of
ideals for law. "Law" or "the law" could continue to serve for
Pound as an object of veneration, "the law" as a gathering up of the
achievements of the past in the ideals which it represented in his
time, and "law", thought of more generally, as representing in
addition successful techniques for adaptation of the law to the
requirements of further stages of societal development. Both
because of their achievement in securing for society ideals
developed in the past and because of their devising of means of
continuing this, Pound felt a respect for the judges which almost
matched in its inducement to feelings of satisfaction Anson's notion
of the law as a monument of common sense. 3 ' At the same time in
Pound's theory, the veneration due to law, the law and the judge did
not depend on any view of law as supporting one set of social ideals
against another set. Indeed, his general statement of the objectives
of the law of his time would be inconsistent with any such notion,
since all demands made on the law from society are treated in a
sense as of equal validity for the tasks which lawyers are called on
to perform. The springs of the ideals which law is called on to
secure are conceived as those of society generally, and the ideals of
"the law" and "law" are in the first case a record of its success and
in the second case a guarantee of the continuance of its success in
the service of the ideals of society. "Law" and "Society" are both
concepts thought to embody ideals with which the lawyer must be
concerned and any conflict which has to be resolved is thought of as
a disequilibrium which may be expected to be only temporary.
3. Law as the Struggle of "Right" to Consciousness
In the course of time Pound was to be found looking askance at
30. Id., 543-544.
3 1. "On the whole, our courts have the best record of any of our institutions." 2
Jurisprudence 463. Cf. 36 Harvard L. Rev. 958.
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newer legal writers just as the classical English writers had looked
askance at him. In article and counter article 32 he found himself in
conflict with the realists, who had proliferated in the period of the
first world war, the aftermath of war, and the onset of economic
depression. All of these factors were conducive to producing
dissatisfactions leading to a radicalism beyond Pound's. Yet
Pound's work had done much to provide realists with jumping-off
points, and in aspects of legal thinking on which the writer is here
concentrating, many of them present similarities to Pound. Like
him, in ways in which they differ from one another, most of them
managed to reconcile a veneration for law33 and the legal profession
with an insistence on the general societal springs of legal
development. Further, in the ways in which they reinterpreted the
relationship between law and society, they could be considered as
reinterpreting Pound in the direction of what they made of
developments particularly in psychological theory outside the law.
Pound's conception of law as a handmaiden, with however vital
contribution to make in this capacity, to the general forces of social
development readily lent itself to reinterpretation, in the light of the
notions of psychological behaviourism, in the direction that law was
to be thought of as a process of official response to environmental
conditions. In Pound, the process of legal decision appeared as a
third meaning of law, the first it will be recalled being law as a
regime of social control - the most general - and the second -
the first more specialised one - as the ideals, precepts and
techniques of the law. The third meaning was clearly the least
important in Pound's scheme, both in the amount of space which
Pound gives to it in his major work on Jurisprudence and in the
function which it served. 34 For Pound it was the application of the
ideals, precepts and techniques. 35 It was otherwise, however, with
the realists and here the sharp differences emerge.
The degree of difference with Pound in this respect varies with
the particular realist we are considering. Jerome Frank represents an
32. See R. Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence (1931), 44 Harvard L.
Rev. 697 and K. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism - Responding to Dean
Pound, Id., 1222.
33. See, e.g., Llewellyn's hymn to "The Common Law Tradition" printed in The
Common Law Tradition (Boston: Little Brown, 1960) 399.
34. Pound's fourth volume of Jurisprudence has 503 pages devoted to the analysis
of general juristic conceptions and 32 pages to "The Judicial Process in Action"
(Chapter 20).
35. See the alternative title to Chapter 20 in 4Jurisprudence 5.
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extreme of difference, since a particular judicial response is
considered to be unique to the stimulus provided by the set of
environmental conditions to which the judge is responding. 36 Thus
not only do the ideals, precepts and techniques of the law fail to
explain the pattern in judicial responses, but, if the idea is carried to
its logical conclusion, there is no such pattern anyhow. In Frank's
case, the contrast is emphasized by the disrespect for the judges
involved in the theory that their failure to recognize that they
necessarily bear the responsibility for their own decisions, and their
attempts to refer them instead to authorities binding upon them, is a
kind of infantilism 37 which Sigmund Freud's theories provide us
with the materials for explaining. Oliphant may be taken as an
example of a more "middle of the road" realist approach. Oliphant,
like Frank, decries the influence of law in Pound's second sense on
the course of decision, but nevertheless is prepared to find a pattern
in the course of decision as it emerges. He demonstrated a greater
respect for the judicial fraternity than Frank did, and believed that
the judges' experience led them to react in orderly fashion to the
different social situations with which they found themselves
faced.Hence we can expect to explain the pattern of such decision
by ourselves concentrating on the study of the social sciences, and
looking for the principles of judicial action there. 38 The later history
of realism since its heyday about the time of the depression seems to
consist in a swing to the left by some jurimetricians and a swing to
the right by perhaps realism's most influential exponent, Llewellyn.
In some current jurimetrical writing the judge's responses are
measured in terms of the predisposing factors arising out of the
judge's own personal history in relation to the categories of social
situation with which the judge is faced in litigation over a period.
When the results for the different judges of a court or judicial
system are correlated, what is seen to emerge is not any set of
general principles of judicial action but rather a profile of the
particular court or judicial system. 39 The method of procedure,
moreover, discounts the possibility of arriving at a correlation
36. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Coward-McCunn,
1930). See Llewellyn's comment on this aspect of Frank's work in Some Realism
about Realism - Responding to Dean Pound (1931), 44 Harvard L. Rev. 1222,
1231.
37. Op. cit. last note.
38. Herman Oliphant,A Return to Stare Decisis (1928), 14 A.B.A. Journal 71 and
159.
39. E.g., G. Schubert, Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (1959).
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between decisions and the principles which purport to be applied in
the reasons accompanying a decision. The judge continues to be
treated, in the phrase used in criticism of early realism, like
Pavllov's dog.
Matters took a different course in the Chicago of Karl Llewellyn,
who, in the respects most important for the present topic, is more
like Pound than many other realists. Whether this was true of
Llewellyn throughout his writing life is a controversial matter which
the writer does not presume to be able to settle. In "The Bramble
Bush" he had suggested the overriding importance for investigation
of what judges do in relation to what they say in support of what
they do, 40 and elsewhere he attacked the biblical statement that "In
the beginning was the Word" by claiming that in the beginning was
not a word but a doing. 41 Yet Llewellyn claimed that these
statements were reconcilable in their context with attaching
particular importance to judicial pinning down of ideals in precepts,
and particularly in the techniques by which they do it. Technique
was a major object of his inquiry in his later work. He contrasted in
this respect the "Grand Style", which he approved, and the
"Formal Style", which he deprecated. The former was seen to
involve a very free use of precedent, the latter a much narrower
adherence to the reasons given in the precedents. The former was
seen as characteristic of the golden age of Lord Mansfield and
others,42 the latter as characteristic, with conspicuous exceptions
among individuals, of the intervening period up to the relatively
recent past.43 But recently the judges, in Llewellyn's view, have
been recapturing the Grand Style if at first largely on the
unconscious level. What he saw, therefore, as one of his own
immediate missions was to restore judicial confidence by
convincing them that they were doing better than they or others
knew" - that the facts were "joyous"14 5 - and to foster the
adoption of the Grand Style among the judiciary at the conscious
level.
The insistence on the actuality of a free use of precedent by the
judiciary, as well as the insistence on the importance of the
40. The Bramble Bush (New York: Ocean Publications, 2 ed., 1951) 12.
41. 44 Harvard L. Rev. 1222.
42. The Common Law Tradition 36 and table on introductory page v. Cf. id., 5-6.
43. Id., 38-40.
44. See, e.g., the quotation from T. R. Powell in The Bramble Bush 49.
45. The Common Law Tradition 4.
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distinction between the conscious and the unconscious, preserves in
Llewellyn's work important lessons of realist thinking. But what
rendered him able to escape from the confines of the narrow focus
of attention on judicial operations as distinct from judicial thought,
which extreme realist thinking might have suggested, was
particularly the manner in which he married the modem
psychological notion of the unconscious with his own variety of
traditional ethical intuitionism. This comes out especially in a
consideration of Llewellyn's reasons for supporting the use of the
technique of the Grand Style. For him its usefulness consisted in the
manner in which it enabled the judges to work their way towards
principles which could not in the first instance be grasped and
articulated in a general formulation, 4" although the result which
they were ultimately found to dictate might be felt to be the right
result in a prior series of individual decisions. But to a large degree
he believed that once success was achieved in articulating at the
conscious level a principle which had been exerting its effect in
decisions at the unconscious level, it could be seen to be right by a
sort of flash of inspiration.
47
In this way interest not only in techniques of argument leading to
decision, and in the struggle for the realisation of ideals to be
articulated in precepts by this means, but also in the ideal content of
some precepts embodied in the law as the end product of a
successful struggle, was re-established from a realist point of view.
Llewellyn continued to think of some factors in individual judicial
decisions as unrelated to principles which might turn out to be of
lasting value - "equities of the fireside". 48 But the notion that
some factors in response were in terms of intuiting principles - at
first on the unconscious level but then consciously at the end of a
struggle - was the vehicle of a return to moderate reformism. On
this basis the current achievements of the legal profession were
treated with some enthusiasm, both on the level of technique and on
the level of achieved ideals. Llewellyn wrote a hymn to the common
46. "Response by the court to the need - but not as yet with understanding of its
meaning" Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales (Chicago: Callaghan, 1930)
342.
47. -"[T]he certainty in question is that certainty after the event which makes
ordinary men and lawyers recognize as soon as they see the result that however
hard it has been to reach, it is the right result" (Op. cit. n. 45, 185-86).
48. Id., 270. Cf. id., 157. Also called "the accidental issues and needs of the
individual case" in K. N. Llewellyn and E. A. Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press 1941) 314.
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law49 and even a poem about judicial obiter dicta, 50 which might in
his view come closer to the principle which would ultimately be
seen to be right than the principle on which a case purported to be
decided - "Words may be fragrant as they pass."' 5 In one respect,
Llewellyn's moderate reformism was more "practical" than
Pound's had been. Llewellyn is said to have been fond of saying,
indeed, that his Jurisprudence was the most practical subject in the
law course. 52 In the most interesting and urgent areas of legal
studies involving the adjustment of law to current social conditions,
operation of Pound's scheme of analysis on any thoroughgoing level
called for the use of a complex intellectual apparatus. Any attempt
to decide a case on the basis of which alternative decision would
best further the sum total of human demand to the greatest extent
possible is obviously a large undertaking. And while Pound was
prepared to offer a group of conceptions which would enable us to
work out a scheme of interests to be subserved and eliminate the
necessity of approaching this problem ad hoc in the individual case,
he was not prepared to apply that method himself to present us with
the scheme of interests appropriate to the fifth stage of law through
which he conceived us to be now passing. He thought this to be
premature at the time he wrote. 53 We are called on, therefore, to
make a variety of comprehensive sociological and philosophical
inquiries for ourselves to follow Pound's prescriptions and to many
this task, though challenging, may appear to be intractable for
everyday purposes. Llewellyn's approach is calculated to em-
phasize more the value to be gained by examining, though by no
means exclusively, the traditional and available legal authorities and
struggling to bring to our own consciousness the principles which,
with the experience they provide for us and the suggestions they
offer, our own intuition will tell us are right. In this way we may
hope to train ourselves in arriving at predictions of future decision
appropriate to the lawyer's task - which Llewellyn contrasts with
those of the more general social sciences addressed to the
comfortable sweep of the decades - of directing ourselves to what
49. Seesupra n. 33.
50. K. N. Llewellyn Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago 1962) 166.
51. Ibid.
52. Cf. "I must come up with tools of analysis which any thinking man of law can
understand both in their nature and their use, and I must come out with results in
words which he can not only understand but put to work" The Common Law
Tradition 516.
53. 3Jurisprudence 14-15.
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will happen in a case next Thursday. 54 In this emphasis on study of
the traditional materials, Llewellyn was of course in contrast not
only with Pound, but with earlier realists as well. It is said that in
the first flush of realism at Yale, its exponents were rarely found in
the law school at all. They were, for example, out in the New Haven
highways examining the psychological responses of motorists to the
legal phenomenon of traffic lights.
4. Law as the Articulation of Reason
What Llewellyn did in Chicago with the weapon of traditional
ethical intuitionism, Lon L. Fuller did in Harvard with the weapon
of traditional ethical rationalism. For Fuller as for the realists law is
a process. 55 But this starting point does not involve for Fuller a long
process of subsequent reasoning to establish the importance in law
of legal ideals. The notion of ideals as integral to law is inherent in
his notion of the process itself from the beginning. In their differing
notions of what is involved in a "process", twentieth century
American legal thinkers reflect the division in Western intellectual
tradition apparent as long ago as in the time of the early Greek
philosophers. The earlier realists, though this perhaps emerges more
clearly in the later writings of Lasswell and McDougal of Yale when
an analysis of the notion came to be used as one method of
analysing legal situations, 5 6 are in the tradition stemming from
Heraclitus. According to this tradition, reality is flux, and if we see
in its more durable features more than patterns in the flux, we are
misled. Fuller, on the other hand, belongs to the tradition of
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. According to this tradition, a process
is a striving towards perfection which alone makes the process
intelligible. 57 While it has been remarked that in the case of
inanimate objects this notion is to many people implausible - the
notion that there are no perfect triangles, for example, but that the
imperfect ones we see would be perfect, if they could, seems queer
- the same author has remarked that in the field of human affairs it
has very much greater plausibility. 58 It is human affairs with which
54. The Common Law Tradition 6 and 16.
55. Fuller's creature Foster uses this term in Problems of Jurisprudence
(Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1949) 82.
56. See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell and Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence in
Policy-Oriented Perspective (1966-67), 19 University of Florida L. Rev. 486, 505.
57. See especially American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century (1954), 6 Journal
of Legal Education 457, 470.
58. John Burnet, Greek Philosophy Part I - Thales to Plato (1924 ed.) 156.
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Fuller is concerned and he has devoted himself to demonstrating
that this approach is revealing and inspirational not only in relation
to law, but in other human intellectual "enterprises" 59 - the term
he prefers to "process" - as well.
More specifically, Fuller sees law as a co-operative human
enterprise directed at a reasoned harmony of human relations.
60
Both because of the appeal in this concept to the idea of
co-operation and because of the appeal to human reason, Fuller's
thinking shares with Llewellyn's those elements which we have
called, in Llewellyn's case, practical features. In the lawyer's task
of predicting judicial decision, he will be guided in Fuller's view by
the assumption, unless he has special grounds for the contrary
assumption in a particular case, that the judge will be guided by
what justice demands. 61 And since the student or lawyer shares a
common humanity, and hence a common human reason, with the
judge, he has prospects of working out in advance what justice does
demand. In doing so, he will certainly look for guidance to the
traditional legal authorities as he would in Llewellyn's approach
for, as Fuller puts it, the development of human reason demands
attention to what man has made of himself at the present stage,
6 2
and therefore to what the human legal enterprise has made of itself.
But a relatively free use of the authorities is demanded in Fuller's
approach as in Llewellyn's, for the flux of judicial decision is only
seen as intelligible at all in terms of the objects of striving, 63 which
the student must discern in the light of the struggle towards reason
which characterises the enterprise.
Fuller's work represents a high-water mark in a long period of
moderate reformism, in its presentation of a concept of "law"
which contains within itself inherently by its nature social ideals to
which people wish to commit themselves and social ideals,
moreover, conceived as being as broad as those of our common
humanity. The evolutionary aspect of Pound's thought is preserved
in the notion of law as one process of human realisation of its own
true or higher nature, without the invitation implicit in Pound's
thought to think of the evolution of law as a response to social
demands external to the law itself, an invitation accepted by the
59. See, e.g., Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press 1964) 106.
60. The Law in Quest ofltself (Chicago: Northwestern University Press 1940) 2-3.
61. Problems of Jurisprudence 85.
62. Reason and Fiat in Case Law (1946), 59 Harvard L. Rev. 376, 380.
63. Id., 386-7,392.
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more extreme realists in conceiving of the environment to which
legal activity responds as causally more important in legal outcomes
than the criteria in terms of which lawyers were traditionally
supposed to respond. In Fuller's concept of law, the American ideal
of a government of laws and not of man is protected against the
notion that the government of law involves its support of the
'establishment" against progress. Fuller's concept gave a
theoretical foundation for the statement one heard in Harvard that
we cannot understand what the law is unless we know what the law
ought to be. And in assisting understanding of what the law is by his
discussion and writing, Fuller encourages the student to exercise
care to distinguish his own contribution to its interpretation in the
light of what it ought to be from those in official positions. The
enterprise of law develops in the constant re-telling of the story of
its development, with no authentic official version. 6 4
Insofar as we can characterise "new line" legal writing as
distinct from "old line", as spoken of by Erwin Griswold, it is
probably in terms of what would be suggested as an appropriate
approach by the inspirational features common to the approaches of
those writers we have taken as representative of a long and
relatively continuous moderate reformism, with variations in style
and approach represented by their differences. Most legal writing,
at any rate about the domestic common law in a particular common
law country, would seem to fit into such a scheme of analysis. Yet it
may be that in terms of such a characterisation we will in the course
of time come to be as nostalgic about "new line" writing as
Griswold was about "old line" writing in his remark mentioned
earlier. One detects in general community thinking at the present
time, presenting itself as a demand for progress, an association of
"law" with the "establishment" and an appeal to what is
demanded by society or humanity in opposition to what are thought
to be the demands of the law. In this kind of thinking law seems to
be regarded simply as binding precepts, and as constituting
therefore chains which require to be broken if the community is to
break free of the trammels of-the past. The "received ideals" in
Pound's second meaning of law and the techniques for their
adaptation, elements in it to which we have seen other moderate
reformists among jurists attached equal importance though in
different formulations, are on the approach now under consideration
64. The Law in Quest ofitself 138-140.
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excluded. Hence law is left, as it were, with little to say for itself,
for the features of it which were seen by the writers we have
discussed were those which were thought by them to justify it - not
because of their theoretically binding quality but in terms of their
real value for societal development. Nowadays, community
thinking tends to adopt society as a frame of reference for
formulating idealsfor law, which must be implemented by a rapid
transformation of it, rather than expecting to find ideals in law
commanding respect. This is a challenge to our fundamental frames
of thinking, calling for critical re-appraisal of the type of legal
thinking we have been examining through this historical sketch as
well as some critical appraisal of the type of thinking which is
struggling to replace it.
II. A Critical Sketch
In the foregoing the writer has purported to detect correlations
between the work of particular writers, taken as representatives of
leaders of legal thought especially in the present century, and
particular kinds of traditional ethical theory. Thus English
positivism was seen, in its origins at any rate, to be associated with
Utilitarianism, Pound's sociological jurisprudence with evolutio-
nary ethics, Llewellyn's realism with intuitionism in ethics, and
Fuller's natural law approach with rationalism in ethics. This is only
a matter of degree in the case of each of the writers concerned. It
would not be difficult to detect in each case signs of the alternative
approaches espoused by others of the writers taken, for example, to
detect some reliance on the notion of the unfolding progress
characteristic of evolutionary ethics in Fuller. But it is believed,
nevertheless, that if one were to go beyond these writers to other
examples of the schools of which they are representative, one would
find that the particular kind of ethical association which we have
detected in individual writers of a school persists in others of the
same school to a degree enabling us to say that it is dominant. Thus,
for example, evolutionary ethical theory is dominant in modern
sociological jurisprudence, being more strongly apparent in
Ehrlich, 65 for example, than it is in Pound. The idea of an intuitive
response to a social situation yielding a more satisfactory result for
the judge than a -slavish attention to doctrine is by no means
65. Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1936, trans.
Moll.) discussed in this respect infra.
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confined to Llewellyn among the realists. Bentham's Utilitarianism
communicated itself to a number of positivist legal thinkers in
England, especially to those who closely followed him like John
Austin, and to later ones as well. With natural law thinkers like
Fuller the connection with rationalism scarcely needs to be argued,
since the connection of this kind of thinking about law and ethical
rationalism is explicit.
Since these thinkers were in the central direction of their interests
legal theorists rather than ethical theorists, they tended to devote
more attention to carrying out their legal thinking within these
ethical frames, rather than to justifying the ethical frames
themselves. They saw urgent problems for the development of law
to which they wished in their writings to make an immediate
contribution, and one does not concentrate one's attention on the
most general problems of navigation when the ship is sinking.
Insofar as they sought to justify their general approaches, it was
more in terms of their usefulness for achieving objectives in the
improvement of the law rather than in terms of their theoretical
validity. But at a time like the present, when more moderate
approaches to law reform are the subject of fundamental radical
questioning, any vulnerability which these approaches have to
theoretical philosophical attack becomes of major importance.
1. Criticisms of Ethical Rationalism
Because the ethical frames in question are of a traditional character,
and because ethical matters are traditionally the subject of
philosophical division and mutual controversy, each standard type
of ethical approach finds itself the subject of standard traditional
criticisms. Beginning with the point of view of which we have taken
Fuller as representative, we may ask: What are the standard
criticisms of rationalism? As put by a philosopher influential in the
writer's University, they develop along the following lines. We
examine the claims of reason to provide us with ideals commanding
our allegiance by examining how and why it is we do reason. In the
area with which we are here concerned, it is claimed that we reason
that we should support a certain course of conduct X (whether by
lawgivers or private individuals), because it has the character Y.
Then why, the reasoning goes on, do we support Y? We may find
ourselves answering, because activities characterised by Y have the
character Z. But it is obvious, the argument goes on, that at some
point the chain of reasons must stop. And at this point, it is claimed,
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the reasoner is saying no more than that, if we take Z to be the point
where the reasons stop, he supports Y because he is a Z sort of
person, because he lives in a certain way, supports this kind of
objective.
66
It is little different, the argument proceeds, if we think of the
reasoning as proceeding not within a single mind, but between two
or more people by way of argument and persuasion. There are
conceived to be limits to persuasion and discussion, which can only
satisfactorily take place under conditions "where there are common
ways of living, common demands arising from communicating
activities".67 The conclusion of the reasoning in this case is the
joint assertion of such a common demand and the observation of its
relationship to the proposed course of conduct about which the
argument began.
In the criticism of rationalism for which the preceding account of
features of the actual reasoning process is designed to provide a
basis, it is claimed that rationalism in the first place attempts to
obtain a dialectical advantage by ignoring the multiplicity of
objectives, ways of living, or movements, which provide the
sources of norms of conduct for different people and groups. When
we tell a person that some action is ultimately demanded by reason,
we represent it as favouring what he supports as well as what we
support. Even if he remains uncertain about this, we at least confuse
his mind by leading it away from the point that reasoning can justify
itself only in terms of some source of norms, that source being an
objective or complex of objectives, which will only appeal to him if
he happens to share it. 68 The argument recognizes, however, that,
in its refined philosophical form as distinct from its use in popular
discussion, rationalism seeks to grapple with the problem of finding
a source of norms which must necessarily appeal to all, and the
argument then seeks to rebut the rationalist claims in this respect.
Rationalism is seen as claiming that, while men obviously seek
conflicting objectives at times, these demands can be distinguished
from those constituting man's true, essential, or higher nature, and
the existence of the contingent or lower demands may even be
explained as failure to exercise properly the reasoning powers with
which man is equipped to deduce an appropriate course of action
66. John Anderson, Studies in Empirical Philosophy (Sydney: Angus &
Robertson, 1962) 352.
67. Id., 247.
68. Cf. id., 250.
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from this true nature. Hence arose Bentham's jibe against this kind
of thinking that according to it, the evil man is just a man who
asserts falsehoods.69 The purported rebuttal of rationalist claims
runs that in fact the conflicts of objectives between different
movements among human beings are real like any other human
phenomenon and the distinction sought to be made can only be
supported by the assertion of higher and lower levels of reality - on
the basis of a distinction between a metaphysical and a physical
world. In the Greek writing, in which rationalism as far as our
knowledge goes originated, it is so justified. The striving, moving
world of Fuller's "enterprises" is in Socratic theory not being, only
becoming - the real world of being is the ideal world towards
which the striving takes place, the world of forms with its
organizing principle "the form of the Good".
70
In the criticism of rationalism which we are here following
through, the metaphysical solution to the problem of the
reconciliation of human conflict with a universal source of norms in
universal human nature, is asserted to be philosophically unsound.
An account could only be given of the relationship between the
world of becoming and the world of being if they could be regarded
as existing together in a medium which embraces both of them, but
to posit such a medium would break down the distinction between
the two worlds and envisage their existence in the same way, in the
way that is involved in existence in that single medium. The
Socratic position is therefore considered to be inherently contradic-
tory and unintelligible. The forms themselves are likewise
conceived to be on this view unintelligible, pure universals the
function of which is to enable us to assert general features of things
in the physical world, but about which themselves nothing can. be
consistently asserted since this would contradict their nature by
treating them as things to be characterised. No explanation can be
given of them. Thus it is claimed that Socrates never explains "the
form of the Good" except by vague metaphor, and falls back upon
the opinion of right thinking men in the attempt to give it content. 71
Colour is lent to this kind of criticism by features of Fuller's work
in particular. Fuller describes the ideal towards which the law is
considered to be a striving in a variety of ways. It is seen in a
modest, but not complete, formulation as "the basic requirements
69. Referred to id., 228.
70. Id., 211.
71. Ibid.
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of social living" and more ambitiously as "the fullest realisation of
human powers".72 It is seen again as "a rational human
existence" 73 or "reasoned harmony" 74 based on "human nature
itself". 75 The demands of human nature are articulated at the
basic level in the principle of "the common need" 76 which
means "the common need men would perceive and feel if they
knew the facts".77 But to tell us that an ideal is the
"basic requirements of social living" tells us nothing of what the
basic requirements of social living are in the sense of describing
them in terms of any content of empirical fact. Nor are we
enlightened by the use of the phrase "the fullest realisation of
human powers" as to what a physical world in which this realisation
occurred would be like, nor what a "rational human existence"
would be like, ora "reasoned harmony" based on human nature itself,
nor even how we are to recognize when we have achieved the
common need. And what men would perceive and feel as the
common need if they knew the facts is certainly something we could
never find out on any experimental basis, and therefore whether if
the experiments could be carried out a common need would be
perceived at all. Fuller in fact does not seek to give any of these
general ideas this kind of concrete content in any general way, and
that this cannot be done is put down to the deficiencies of the current
state of our understanding. Fuller does provide, in the elaborate
hypothetical example of the ruler named Rex, an account of what a
failure to measure up to a minimum morality of law would be like. 78
But all that appears to emerge is the proposition that minimally laws
must be universal, consistent and intelligible in statement and
application, which leaves the problem of delineating the substantive
content of ideal law untouched.
To these criticisms it might be expected that Fuller would make
the answer that the writer has been presenting criticisms of a view
which is in fact not his. He writes in one place that "[w]e know in
advance that we cannot reach our goal of a social order founded
solely on reason. But we know equally well that it is impossible to
72. The Morality of Law 5.
73. Id., 9.
74. The Law in Quest ofItself 3.
75. The Morality of Law 102.
76. Problems of Jurisprudence 694 ff.
77. Id., 699.
78. The Morality of Law 33-38.
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set in advance a stopping place short of our goal beyond which all
effort will be in vain. The illusion of natural law has at least this
presumption in its favor, that it liberates the energies of men's
minds and allows them to accomplish as much as they can." 79 We
may answer, however, that while it is one thing to set our sights on a
definite goal which is too high for complete achievement in the hope
of reaching some degree of approximation to it, it is quite another to
postulate a goal which must remain forever undefined because the
notion of human reason being able to work it out is theoretically
unsound. If Fuller thinks of natural law as an illusion in this sense,
but useful in liberating energies, the restrictions which this view
would impose on clear scholarly communication would have to be
offset against whatever advantages might accrue in other directions.
In another respect too, Fuller might be expected to claim that our
criticisms are misdirected, for he treats it as a "mistake of the older
natural law school", and of some modem scholars, to reach
"abstract resolutions on ends and then to trace out the implications
of those resolutions for the various branches of the law". s8 Fuller
himself regards the ideal world of values and the world of fact as
inextricably intertwined in a single moving reality. To this we may
reply that it is no answer to the problem of how facts and values
conceived in this way could be related to one another in a single
world, merely to insist that they do exist together. The problem of
rendering intelligible the notion that the moving reality involves
such a relationship remains unsolved.
2. Criticisms of Ethical Intuitionism
To some moral philosophers of the past at all events, it has seemed
that the intuitionism on which Llewellyn relies - the idea of a
principle which may be difficult to sweat into conscious clarity, but
is immediately seen to be right when expressed"' - is indefensible
in the same way as rationalism, but more obviously so. Bentham
says: "The various systems that have been formed concerning the
standard of right and wrong, may all be reduced to the principle of
sympathy and antipathy. One account may serve for all of them.
79. The Law in Quest of Itself 110.
80. American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century (1954), 6 Journal of Legal
Education 457, 479.
81. See, e.g., The Cheyenne Way 330 and his reference to "rules which make
sense on their face" (The Common Law Tradition 38).
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They consist all of them in so many contrivances for avoiding the
obligation of appealing to any external standard, and for prevailing
upon the reader to accept the author's sentiment or opinion as a
reason for itself." 82 While this criticism may apply equally to
rationalism and intuitionism, at least in the case of rationalism the
author's sentiment seeks to justify itself by reference to general
human nature and it is only at the end of a long dispute with the
rationalist that one might come to the conclusion that reason in
matters of moral argument can only function in relation to some
demand or "sentiment" personal to the author of the argument or
shared between himself and those with whom he is arguing. But in
the case of the intuitionist the idea that some kinds of convictions of
rightness are a guarantee of their own correctness tends to be put
forward as dogma, and it seems to be so in Llewellyn's case. And
any attempt to break down the distinction between conviction and
truth or correctness can only be obscuring philosophically.
The moral philosopher Sidgwick does indeed distinguish between
dogmatic and philosophical intuitionism, but insofar as philosophi-
cal justifications of intuitionism have been attempted they have
generally involved the same kind of appeal to metaphysics into
which rationalism has in its classical versions been driven, with the
same kind of resulting philosophical problems of establishing
relationships between different worlds. Thus the intuitionist
Butler83 set up a special faculty of the mind described as
conscience, the decrees of which were supposed to possess a higher
authority than the decrees of the ordinary passions. But since
conscience was disinterested by its nature and passions interested by
their nature, demonstration of how one could move to influence the
other presented a seemingly insoluble problem. Butler purported to
solve it by the conception of a self-love which mediated between
conscience and the passions, seeking the happiness of the mind
through reconciling the demands of the passions for their external
objectives with the demands of duty laid down by conscience. But
this merely substitutes the problem of how three quite different
worlds can be related to one another for the problem of finding how
two can.
82. Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (London: W.
Pickering, 1823 ed.) Chapter II, 28, cited Anderson, Studies in Empirical
Philosophy 228.
83. Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons (1726).
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It seems questionable whether Llewellyn is in any better position
by positing special authority in terms of "rightness" for those
decrees which have been arrived at by a process in which the
assertion of a principle at the conscious level is the outcome of a
process in which the principle, as it were, fights its way up from the
unconscious. The fact that such a principle ultimately gets the
conscious seal of approval may indicate that it reconciles for the
time being various demands within the personality of the individual
legal reasoner or the group where, as in the case of the development
in a line of judicial authority, it is a group effort. But there seems
nothing in Freud's theories which would suggest that there is here
involved any more than a perhaps very temporary adjustment of
conflict, which could break out. again when factors of which the
person or group was unaware at any level came to exert their
influence, when the "right" principle might no longer seem
"right" to the very same people in terms of their very same
demands.
3. Criticisms of Ethical Utilitarianism
If, however, we find substance in Bentham's criticisms of
intuitionism, it does not necessarily follow that his own
Utilitarianism, influential in positivist legal thought as we have
indicated, is in any better position, despite its claims to find an
external standard guaranteeing the rightness of a course of action,
legal or otherwise. "What one expects to find in a principle",
Bentham said, "is something that points out some external
consideration as a means of warranting and guiding the internal
sentiments of approbation and disapprobation." 8 But it has seemed
to some that the only way of "warranting" or "guiding" our
internal sentiments is by appealing to others of our internal
sentiments, even if in terms of pointing out some external situation
which has an appeal to those other internal sentiments.8 5 Nor does it
seem that utilitarianism, if thought of as reducible to a kind of
intuitionism if the validity of this criticism of it is accepted, is any
more defensible in that form than other kinds of intuitionism. As
pointed out earlier, the utilitarian criterion for the rightness of
actions is the contribution of a projected course of conduct,
including a projected legislative act, to "the greatest happiness of
84. Op. cit. Chapter II, 27, cited Anderson op. cit. 228.
85. Andersonop. cit. 228-30.
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the greatest number". But the objectives of a sentiment so described
turn out not even to be intelligible. "Happiness" or "pleasure", as
Bentham's catalogue of pleasures shows, 86 turns out to be no more
than what we like or want and the mere enumeration of wanted
things gives us no means of estimating the relative worth of
different possible courses of action over others, of working out a
total of pleasure involved in one possible course of action as
compared with the total involved in another. 87 Economists have
found it possible indeed to plot the relative keenness of demands in
particular individuals by reference to what they do in different
situations, and likewise to estimate the relative keenness of
demands among particular individuals where it is possible to
observe their interactions in some market. But this progress in
investigation was achieved only by abandoning the Benthamite
notion of quantities of pleasure in the abstract with which
economists began, and there is no total human market which could
serve to reinstate in intelligible terms the idea of making any
general estimate of the quantities of pleasure attached to particular
kinds of human activity.
4. Criticisms of Evolutionary Ethics
This line of criticism is not only important in relation to the ethical
frame of some of the thinking of legal positivism. It also sets
problems for Pound's hypothesis about the fundamental objectives
of the fifth and current stage in socio-legal evolution. Pound states
this to be "seeking to satisfy the maximum of the whole scheme of
human desires or expectations (or wants, or demands) so far as it
may be done through the legal order without too much sacrifice",88
In another of his formulations the new object of social control is to
"reconcile these desires, or wants, so far as we can, so as to secure
as much of the totality of them as we can". 89 Again, he puts it that
we must satisfy "as much of' human demand as we can satisfy
with a minimum of friction and waste, with "the least sacrifice of
the totality of interests" .9o There seem to be assumptions made in
much of this language that a general calculus of human pleasures is
86. Given by Bentham in op. cit. chapter 5, 56.
87. Anderson op. cit. 231.
88. 1 Jurisprudence 543.
89. Id., 544.
90. 3Jurisprudence 334.
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an intelligible notion, in which case Pound's approach to current
problems may be vulnerable to the criticisms advanced against
Bentham's ethics on general theoretical grounds, to which added
colour is lent by historical trends in economic theory. If so, Pound is
chasing a chimaera.
It is no answer to this criticism to say that society is itself a
market in which the respective keenness of different human
demands, at any rate in that society, is demonstrated by the actual
results of their interaction. If in this sense society does serve as a
market in the way a market in the more ordinary sense serves the
purposes of economic investigation, it is not, nevertheless, the sort
of market which will serve as a criterion for the rightness either of
conduct or measures of social regulation. On such a criterion, the
notion of society as it ought to be would be amalgamated with that
of society as it is, and this would satisfy few ethical thinkers and
certainly not Pound himself. Nor is it what Pound appears to
envisage. The criterion is not society as we have it, but rather the
society which is coming to be - the society in which changes
taking place now will issue in some degree of equilibrium. It may be
plausible to suppose that we could, with sufficient information
about current casual factors and the field in which they are
operating, arrive at a prediction of the features of that equilibrium
situation which might serve as an incentive to us to throw our
weight into the cause of advancing the future social and legislative
progress. For this, however, to be regarded a s necessarily
indicating to us what is right, it would be necessary for us to think
that what will emerge in the near future will necessarily be better
than what exists now. This is an assumption in fact made by
evolutionary ethical theory, which we believe to be represented by
Pound's general approach, and therefore calls for examination here.
Any theory of ethics as evolutionary would appear to bear a
heavy onus of proof in the light of what we seem actually to observe
in the study of history generally, especially if we take broad time
spans. What we seem to observe in the history of civilisations is
periods of barbarism intervening between periods of culture, stages
of growth and stages of decay. Pound, in explaining the stages of
development of law, himself finds parallel stages of growth in laws
belonging to different periods of human history in general, which
we would perhaps think of as periods of civilisation as opposed to
barbarism. The logical implication is that in the case of the older
ones, as distinct from our present one, periods of growth were
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succeeded by stages of decay or disruption, and indeed the reason
why Pound is only able to speculate cautiously about the next stage
of our law, is that disruption of the older ones occurred before the
stage of maturity of law had been transcended. Any historical
process, social or otherwise, has on any scientific approach a
beginning and an end and the notion of a permanently improving
social process, in which each stage is a necessary introduction to the
next stage and has a subordinate goodness on that account, is
unhistorical and unscientific. The very fact that the idea which
Pound puts forward as his goal of law for our own era as a logical
development from the previous stages, and yet that goal is
substantially in the Utilitarian terms of Bentham so highly
influential one hundred and fifty years ago, calls attention to the
dubious account of actual cultural history by which it is sought to
give the notion of evolution plausibility. Nor is Pound's notion of
the goal as achievement of a sum or average of societal demands
any invention even of Bentham. The utilitarian idea appears fully
fledged in writers prior to Bentham, 91 and the general notion
appears in the position taken by Glaucon in Plato's Republic. 9
2
The unscientific character of evolutionary ethical doctrine is
obscured in the minds of some by the supposition that it is
connected with the views of that respected nineteenth century
innovator in the field of the natural sciences, Charles Darwin. Yet
ultimately the evolutionary ethical approach is opposed to Darwin's
and in line with the approaches of earlier thinkers, with antiquarian
prototypes in the theories of Parmenides, the father of materialism,
and Anaxagoras, but stemming more immediately in the modem
period from Hegel, especially through Marx. In Darwin's approach,
the relationship between a thing and its environment is not
absolutely fixed, and in any struggle it is logically just as possible
that the environment will give way and not the thing environed, or
vice versa. On the other hand, what is characteristic of evolutionary
ethics in its own historical development is the supposition of a
dualism between Man and Nature, in which overwhelming forces
are supposed to be at work on one side or the other - the side which
represents the true reality while that of the other is only dependent.
The contest between the Hegelians and the Marxists in the general
91. See, e.g., 16 International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York:
MacMillan, Free Press, 1968, ed. D. L. Sills) 224 and Bibliography 229.
92. Book II, referred to in Anderson op. cit. 227.
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philosophical area is about the question on which side the
overwhelming forces lie.
In Hegelianism history is seen as the development of universal
spirit towards the rationality which is its essential nature, through
stages in each of which contradictions are solved by the dialectical
process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, at successively higher
levels of rationality. Spirit, or mind, has a reconciling mission,
though the reconciliations which it effects are not seen as between
conflicts existing in things independent of mind, but as conflicts of
its own. It is the fundamental stuff of reality, its movements are the
movements of the totality. Such a view gains plausibility from the
thinking of earlier modern philosophers like Berkeley, who took the
view that the mind knows its own ideas and that the reality observed
by the mind is therefore "thought", and Descartes, for whom the
existence of the mind in turn is seen in its having thoughts. The
inner identity of the subject and object of thought suggested by such
approaches lends itself to the notion of the total reality as a
developing stream of consciousness. Yet to such a view we may
oppose the consideration that this sort of tenet really confuses the
process of thinking with objects of thought by exploiting an
ambiguity in popular language in this regard. If it were really true
that what the mind knows is only in the mind itself, this would
equally apply to these theories, which could be regarded as having
no more objective truth than anything else the mind knows, and the
logical outcome would be scepticism about the possibility of
knowing anything at all. In practice, theorists of this kind do not
draw the sceptical conclusion, but what does happen in practice is
that consideration of the mind in terms of "thoughts" distracts
attention from questions of what it actually is that does the
thinking.93 A theory of minds as one kind of thing in the ordinary
world of experience interacting with other kinds of things according
to regular laws of the same kind as are exhibited in the interactions
of non-mental physical things is exhibited, by contrast with Hegel,
in Freud. In this respect Freud's approach is like Darwin's and not
like the doctrines of evolutionary ethics.
In Marxist thought, in contrast to Hegelian, the fundamental
reality is in Matter rather than in Mind, and it is in the material
world that the overwhelming forces of evolution lie. "[T]he ideal
93. Cf. Anderson's Chapter 8 "The Place of Hegel in the History of Philosophy"
in Studies in Empirical Philosophy 79-87.
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[world] is nothing else than the material world reflected by the
human mind and translated into forms of thought". 94 Seeing
idealism and materialism as the two fundamental tendencies in
philosophy, the Marxist rejects the subjectivism of the former, in
which bodies can only be sensations sprung from the mind, and falls
back on the objectivity of fundamental matter. But the Hegelian
notion of evolution and especially societal evolution through stages,
characterised by the dialectical process posited by Hegel, is
retained. It is a doctrine of dialectical materialism as opposed to
dialectical idealism. Therefore it shares with Hegelianism the notion
of a moving totality, and attaches features to that totality which are
more plausibly attached to it when the totality is thought of as
fundamentally mental than when it is thought of as fundamentally
material in the Marxist fashion. Reality is perceived as developing
through a process of logic, proposition (thesis) and counter
proposition (antithesis) followed by solution (synthesis) until the
argument breaks out again at the next higher stage. Contradictions
thus occur in the material world itself, leaving the inquirers into it
without the tests which may ordinarily be employed to establish
who is right and who is wrong in arguments in the ordinary sense
between people. Ultimately this must lead, like the older established
version of Hegelianism, to scepticism which, however, the Marxist
does not embrace. 9 5 But even if he does not, the effect is to subvert
the scientific faith in a reality in which the regular operation of
cause and effect permit the discovery of scientific principles.
Moreover, the Marxist must attribute a design or purpose to reality
which again would be more plausible if we supposed it to be mental
after the manner of the older Hegelians. The Marxist Kautsky
claims that "it was the materialist conception of history which has
first completely deposed the moral ideal as the directing factor of
social evolution, and has taught us to deduce our social aims solely
from the knowledge of the material foundations". 96 Clearly, social
aims can only be "deduced" from the material foundations if the
material foundations have their own aims.9 7 In fact in spite of
Marx's materialism man and society are in practice the subject of
94. Karl Marx, preface to the second edition of Capital, quoted Anderson op. cit.
302.
95. Cf. Anderson op. cit. 306-311.
96. Karl Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1914, ed. Kerr) 201.
97. Anderson op. cit. 321.
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his history and the rationalising of things is identified as their
"coming to consciousness".
But, whatever may be said about the consistency with which
Hegel and Marx adhere to their opposing views of the fundamental
nature of the moving totality, the major point of criticism of
evolutionary ethics in general must be made in relation to the
assumption which they explicitly share - the assumption of a
totality of things moving inevitably in the direction of rationality. In
ordinary language, when we distinguish change from what changes
we are clearly not thinking of what changes as something eternal. It
is only if we think of the substance of change, what changes, as
itself a pattern of processes that we can indeed think of "it"
changing. We can then think of the discontinuance of some
processes which do not affect the pattern as we are envisaging it, but
what we think of as in this sense the subject of change we know will
also be a stage in the changes of some other pattern. We not only do
not have to hypothesise some substance as the subject of all
changes, but to do so would appear to involve us in insoluble
problems to explain how changes could be attributed to it. In this
respect, evolutionary ethics is really in the tradition stemming from
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in its attitude to change and opposed to
the Heraclitean. And in this respect it appears to be subject to those
philosophical criticisms which we have already put forward in
criticism of the older forms of rationalism. It is a doctrine of higher
level reality posing insoluble problems in regard to the manner in
which the higher level of reality is to be conceived as related to what
actually we observe taking place.
II1. Some Conclusions
1. Dangers in the Use of "Society" as a Frame of Reference
for Legal Ideals
The writer has presented the foregoing sketches in the belief that the
matters canvassed have relevance to current thinking about ideals
for law. At the conclusion of the first section it was suggested that
current community thinking tends to adopt society as a frame of
reference for formulating ideals for law, which must be
implemented by a rapid transformation of it, rather than expecting
to find ideals in law commanding respect. In the writer's
experience, this is true of current law students, and it seems to make
no difference in this respect whether they are first year students,
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coming to the subject with ideas previously formed, or final year
students with a general familiarity with the basic branches of the
law. If a class is considering material of some judge or author who
appeals for support to the law considered as an object to which
veneration, or some lesser degree of respect, is due by the nature of
it, the dominant reaction is scornful laughter. If, however,
"society" is appealed to in the same manner and with the same
object, the reaction is one of approval. Teachers have become
familiar with demands that they justify the subject matter of their
teaching in a course in general or in particular areas by reference to
the criterion of its "social relevance".
If the object of the person making the demands is to vindicate his
opinion that what is being taught has no social relevance at all - as in
the writer's experience it sometimes is - and if "society" is being
interpreted in accordance with the most general presuppositions of
evolutionary ethical doctrine - as in the writer's view it frequently is
at whatever level of consciousness - the objective of the questioner is
theoretically bound to be achieved. For, if the general line of criticism
in the second section of the forgeoing is accepted, the answer must be
that what the teacheris teaching has no social relevance at all, whatever
it is in the whole field of human experience he has concerned himself
with. The notion of "society" being set up is a metaphysical one and
nothing in the ordinary world of experience can be demonstrated to
have any logical relationship to it.
We take here as the view of "society" characteristic of
evolutionary ethics that which virtually identifies it with the
fundamental reality whether it is thought of in Marxist or
Non-Marxist Hegelian terms. In Marx's own work society is
practically identified with the fundamental material reality. In
Hegel's the development of spiritual reality is thought of in terms of
the development of society and Hegel's estimate of the degree of
advance of spirit to his own time is recognizable as an account of the
Prussian society of his own time. Society is thus conceived, as
reality, as standing above the particular conflicts that go on in a
particular society at a particular time, above the warring groups
between whom it mediates in the course of progress, and without
itself being a particular kind of political or social force. It is the
Whole articulating itself through time. Social history is at any rate
the central part of the history of the Absolute.
It is not of course being here suggested that those whose constant
appeal is to the demands of society would work out the implications
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of their view in the manner described in the previous paragraph.
Most people are never called upon to develop systematically the
philosophical implications of the manner in which they employ
concepts in political, social and legal argument. Even general legal
theorists do not necessarily find themselves called upon to do so.
We cannot precisely say, for example, what Pound's attitude would
be to the sort of implications we have seen in the kind of view he
takes on ethical matters. We know he condemns economic
approaches such as the Marxist to history generally as being too
narrow. 98 We know, too, that in his whole catalogue of approaches
to history which are thought to be useful in some respects but too
narrow, it is the "civilization view of history", as representative of
which he has considered some non-Marxist Hegelians, 99 which
escapes criticism on this ground. But what Pound is criticizing in
Marxism is not Marxism on the level of philosophical generality as
we have been considering it, but Marxism at a lower level of
generality - as it appears once it has made the logical jump from
treating the design in matter as the fundamental determinant of
progress to seeing economic relations within society as the
fundamental determinant of social progress. Pound's general
position on the philosophical issues between Marx and Hegel, and
more importantly on the philosophical difficulties common to them,
remains indeterminate. By contrast Ehrilich, the great twentieth
century Continental sociological jurist, at least gives us a glimpse of
the tail of the metaphysical cat in the bag of sociological
jurisprudence. His evolutionary ethics is, in the first place, explicit
and not matter of inference. He says: "The doctrine of evolution is
not merely this or that scientific truth; it is the basis of all modem
thinking." 100  State organization "is not a match for the
uninterrupted sway of elemental forces" 101 and the study of the
sources of law is the study of the "vital forces that bring about the
development of legal institutions". 10 2 The law should serve "the
98. 1 Jurisprudence 227-246.
99. While criticising as too narrow political, geographical, ethnological and
economic interpretations of history, Pound refrains from criticism at the same point
in his exposition of the "civilisation interpretation" of history, saying he has
discussed it in connection with the neo-Hegelians (Id. 227). But when one turns to
the relevant section (Id. 158-170) one finds it expository and highly approving
rather than critical.
100. Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law 447.
tO1. Id., 373.
102. Id., 84.
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advance of the human race in the direction of its future
development" ,103 "the idea of tomorrow which is growing out of
the idea of to-day", towards "a goal which lies in the sunlit
distance, which the human mind can divine but not know". 1 0 4 Any
student who requires a teacher to demonstrate the social relevatice
of what the teacher is doing, in the sense of its relevance to the
demands of society understood in this way, can rely on receiving an
unsatisfactory answer.
If, then, "society" is to function intelligibly as a source of
reference from which legal ideals can be deduced, it seems essential
that some meaning should be put on the conception in empirical
terms, that is to say, that some description of what is meant by it
should be put forward, the terms in which have reference to the
kinds of things which we experience in the ordinary way. The writer
has not purported to demonstrate in this brief essay that this cannot
be satisfactorily achieved. He has not even purported to demonstrate
that, for example, the Marxists have not done it. He has only called
attention to the fact that the panoply of dialectical materialist theory
neither protects Marxists from the need to perform this task nor
helps them to achieve it. But metaphysical theorists comrhonly
translate their highest level conceptions into empirical terms, even
though this involves a logical jump and loses them the advantages of
positing an ideal which is in its nature absolutely obligatory on all, a
feature which it is believed can only exist in metaphysical
conceptions. When the Marxists translate the notion of material
development into the relationships between classes conceived as
groups bearing different relationships to the means of production in
a society, and posit the ideal of a classless society, none of the
considerations to which we have called attention necessarily
involves that that ideal is tmintelligible in empirical terms. The
question whether it can serve as a definition of a "society" from
which desirable courses of action now or over a period can be
deduced remains.
But once we commit ourselves to the discussion of ideals
exclusively on the empirical level, the purposes which can be served
by the attempt to put forward a general definition covering ideals for
law must be different. Once we reject the notion that, even though
we in practice struggle with one another to achieve conflicting
103. Id., 204.
104. Id., 211.
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demands, on a higher level our demands are really in harmony, once
we reject also the notion that, even though scientists assume that
nothing can be neglected as being without effects, nevertheless
there are some forces so powerful that nothing can prevail against
them and we cannot do anything but be on their side, once we reject
also the notion that, even though our convictions constantly differ,
some convictions carry a guarantee of their validity with them, then
any comprehensive definition of ideals, however explicit in
empirical terms, will only appeal to those whom the definition
satisfies in terms of their own constitutions as determined by their
own characters as modified in the course of their personal history by
environmental conditions.
The writer will do no more than doubt here whether such a
definition could be arrived at even to satisfy the person who puts it
forward. An individual human mind, especially in the light of
Freudian theory, is seen to contain its own warring elements as
actual societies do, and those objectives to which an individual may
be prepared to commit himself in spite of this as his dominant
motives, seem unlikely to have common features which would
permit them to answer any single substantive description. And when
the definition is thought of as intended to enable different members
of a group to arrive at a common statement of their comprehensive
ideal, the difficulties in the way of any general definition proving
satisfactory in this context are multiplied. But, by contrast to the
actual degree of success which such attempts are likely to achieve,
certain motives for putting forward such definitions are very strong,
and these motives are likely to achieve their objects in inverse
proportion to the degree of explicitness which the purported
definition actually achieves. The purpose of achieving power and
influence within a group is served if a person can make it appear
that he stands for a principle which is the objective of the whole
group and this is most easily done if the principle is vague enough
for objectives which in fact conflict to be capable of being read into
it by strained interpretations. This kind of use of a definition is an
attack on the independence of members of the group, who may find
themselves in the end accused of disloyalty to the group if they do
not accept the interpretation of the supposed common end of the
group put forward by its dominant members. It is certainly a task of
scholars to expose this kind of operation of definitions in the
interests of intellectual freedom and as an intellectual contribution
to other freedoms as well. Some conception of "society", like the
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conception of the State in national socialism, can operate and has
historically operated to destroy the independence of individuals,
institutions and groups within society as a whole. Totalitarianism in
the name of Society is a horse of the same colour as totalitarianism
in the name of the State, and the two kinds are likely to be in fact
combined in any ideology we can recognize as totalitarian involving
the kind of destructiveness we have described.
2. Specification Versus Definition
At this point of the analysis serious questions may be raised by those
who value their independence about the desirability of employing
single frames of reference to accommodate one's ideals for law at
all. The traditional ethical frames contain elements of metaphysical
delusion, the possibility of achieving a satisfactory empirical
definition seems remote and the dangers of misuses of purported
definitions immediate. It would be conceivable for us instead
merely to carry on communication with others in terms of numbers
of specific aims to discover in what areas we might find identity of
aims as a basis of co-operation without attempting to represent the
total of shared aims in any single fashion. Yet the latter approach
will be lacking in inspirational quality, though having a certain
austere appeal to those who regard clarity in discussion as an
absolutely paramount consideration. And in fact the choice between
these two opposite approaches does not exhaust the choices open to
us. Another possibility may now be considered.
There are some kinds of objectives, which at any rate large
numbers of people have, one characteristic of the operation of
which is a search for sympathy, a search for "common ground"
with others of the different groups to which the individual belongs
from the narrowest to the broadest. Various frames of reference for
legal ideals to which reference has been made in the foregoing -
frames which tend to be a cross division of those thrown up by
traditional ethical theories - may function as symbols for the
common ground to which demands of this kind aspire. Thus a
notion which we might express as "common legal values" may
function as a symbol for the common ground which most lawyers
may come to hope to find as bases for co-operation with one
another, "common social values" as a symbol for the common
ground which most members of a society may come to hope to find
as a basis for co-operation within the group, and "common human
values" as a symbol for the common ground which most human
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beings might come to wish to find as a basis for general
co-operation.
Such a symbol as is here conceived is not regarded as capable of
definition in the sense of translation into any single term itself
characterising any general projected state of affairs. It is designed to
be given reference to various projected states of affairs not by
definition but by specification. In other words, what is envisaged is
the compiling of a list of common ideals to which list if it could ever
be completed the symbol would refer as an envelope term. But
neither is it envisaged that no item which appeared on the list at any
particular time would ever be subject to revision. Nor is it envisaged
that there would be any escape from this incompleteness and
tentativeness even if it were possible to make a statistical survey of
the whole human race with expert psychologists and discover what
objectives were in fact common to the great majority of the group at
a particular time. For the kind of demand we are considering may
hope to induce changes in human beings to increase the area of
common ground - to encourage a growth of mutual tolerance. It is
as a rallying point for this kind of activity and a stimulus to system
and progressive comprehensiveness in it that the writer sees the
justification for the retention of this kind of frame in thought about
legal ideals.
As between smaller groups than those discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the usefulness of frames for the formulation of ideals
may be greater, especially where in a society with a degree of
freedom of association groups can be formed along the lines of a
general community of ideals among members. And this does not
merely apply to ideals of mutual conduct as between members of the
group, but to the formulation of the ideals of that group directed
towards larger communities, and in particular towards the legal
development of larger communities. As illustrative of a procedure
among such a group conducing to clarity and effectiveness, the
writer takes here that of the group surrounding Professors Lasswell
and McDougal, long associated with Yale Law School.
Lasswell and McDougal are strongly influenced by the kinds of
motives we have been discussing in searching for common ground
with all - in their phrase, they make the broadest possible
"identifications". 10 5 Thus their goals for law are summed up in
105. See, e.g., McDougal, Lasswell and Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space
(New Haven: Yale, 1963) 141: "In approaching the policy problems of space we
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broad terms as the achievement of a public order of "human
dignity". 106 But this expression is no more than what we have
called here an envelope term, serving as a general expression for a
list of stated objectives. In their terms it does not have immediate
semantic reference, but rather syntactic reference to the list of
objectives which themselves have semantic reference. This list
involves the greatest possible shaping and sharing of values in each
of Lasswell and McDougal's eight value categories - power,
enlightenment, wealth, well-being, skill, affection, respect and
rectitude. 10 7 While this list is intended to be comprehensive, it is
not pretended that complete definition is achieved of each of the
items on the list by this kind of statement about them and further
exercises in definition and specification are seen to be required, and
are engaged upon. 108 The group looks forward to growing
acceptance of values within the scheme as common human values,
common social values and common legal values without fundamen-
tal change in the scheme.
It is, however, beyond the scope of the present article to argue in
support of this or any other scheme. The immediate object is to
suggest the dangers of and rewards in using general frames of
reference for legal ideals in various contexts. The major intellectual
dangers have been suggested to be the temptation, especially by
implication, to fall back on metaphysical conceptions which
bemuse, but do not assist, because of their lack of relation to reality,
and the immense waste of intellectual effort which may be involved
in seeking by strained interpretations of general definitions to relate
proposed courses of action to some single general aim. The main
social dangers have been suggested to be the destruction of the
independence of individuals and groups within a broader society by
the sorts of procedures described in the previous sentence. But there
are rewards in symbolic encouragement to be as comprehensive,
clear and consistent as we can in specifying our own aims for law -
or other things - and emphasizing and facilitating the operation of
our interests in finding common ground with the groups to which we
belong - provided always we are clear about what we are doing.
take the standpoint of citizens who are identified with the future of mankind as a
whole rather than with the primacy of any particular group."
106. See, e.g., Jurisprudence in Policy Oriented Perspective (1966-67), 19
University of Florida L. Rev. 486, 508.
107. Ibid., and Id., 506.
108. See id., 508-509.
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But, whether we resort to such frames or not, it is hoped that the
critical points that I have sought to make will convince some that
our values are not to be discovered by searching for the obligatory
ready made, but rather within ourselves and the process of making a
contribution to law therefore starts with the systematic process of
self examination.
